/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/User.java
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(query);
User input from the login request flows through the LoginController to User.fetch() where it is directly concatenated into a SQL query without sanitization. An attacker can inject malicious SQL through the username parameter during login, potentially bypassing authentication or extracting sensitive data from the database.
`LoginResponse login(@RequestBody LoginRequest input)``User user = User.fetch(input.username);``String query = "select * from users where username = '" + un + "' limit 1";``ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(query);`String query = "select * from users where username = ? limit 1"; PreparedStatement pstmt = cxn.prepareStatement(query); pstmt.setString(1, un); ResultSet rs = pstmt.executeQuery();
Fix applied to prevent SQL Injection
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/LinkLister.java
Document doc = Jsoup.connect(url).get();
User-controlled URL parameter from the request is passed directly to Jsoup.connect() without adequate validation. An attacker can make the server send HTTP requests to arbitrary internal or external URLs, potentially accessing internal services, cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), or performing port scanning. The /links endpoint has no protections against this attack.
`List<String> links(@RequestParam String url) throws IOException{``return LinkLister.getLinks(url);``Document doc = Jsoup.connect(url).get();`URL aUrl = new URL(url); String host = aUrl.getHost(); if (!isAllowedHost(host) || isPrivateIP(host) || host.equals("169.254.169.254")) { throw new BadRequest("Invalid URL"); }
Fix applied to prevent Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/Cowsay.java
processBuilder.command("bash", "-c", cmd);
User input from the 'input' request parameter flows through CowController.cowsay() to Cowsay.run() where it is concatenated directly into a shell command string. The command is then executed via ProcessBuilder with 'bash -c', allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary shell commands by breaking out of the single quotes (e.g., using payload like: ' ; rm -rf / ; ').
`String cowsay(@RequestParam(defaultValue = "I love Linux!") String input)``return Cowsay.run(input);``String cmd = "/usr/games/cowsay '" + input + "'";``processBuilder.command("bash", "-c", cmd);`String sanitized = input.replaceAll("[^a-zA-Z0-9 ]", ""); processBuilder.command("/usr/games/cowsay", sanitized);
Fix applied to prevent Command Injection
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/Comment.java
37 | Statement stmt = null;
38 | List<Comment> comments = new ArrayList();
39 | try {
40 | Connection cxn = Postgres.connection();
41 | stmt = cxn.createStatement();
42 |
43 | String query = "select * from comments;";
44 | ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(query);
45 | while (rs.next()) {
46 | String id = rs.getString("id");
47 | String username = rs.getString("username");
48 | String body = rs.getString("body");
49 | Timestamp created_on = rs.getTimestamp("created_on");
50 | Comment c = new Comment(id, username, body, created_on);
51 | comments.add(c);
FALSE POSITIVE: Line 44 executes a query, but line 43 shows the query is a hardcoded string literal 'select * from comments;' with no user input concatenation or variables involved.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/Comment.java
36 | public static List<Comment> fetch_all() {
37 | Statement stmt = null;
38 | List<Comment> comments = new ArrayList();
39 | try {
40 | Connection cxn = Postgres.connection();
41 | stmt = cxn.createStatement();
42 |
43 | String query = "select * from comments;";
44 | ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(query);
45 | while (rs.next()) {
46 | String id = rs.getString("id");
47 | String username = rs.getString("username");
48 | String body = rs.getString("body");
49 | Timestamp created_on = rs.getTimestamp("created_on");
50 | Comment c = new Comment(id, username, body, created_on);
FALSE POSITIVE: Line 43 contains a hardcoded SQL string literal 'select * from comments;' with no concatenation of user input. This is a static query, not SQL injection.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/Postgres.java
28 | }
29 | return null;
30 | }
31 | public static void setup(){
32 | try {
33 | System.out.println("Setting up Database...");
34 | Connection c = connection();
35 | Statement stmt = c.createStatement();
36 |
37 | // Create Schema
38 | stmt.executeUpdate("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users(user_id VARCHAR (36) PRIMARY KEY, username VARCHAR (50) UNIQUE NOT NULL, password VARCHAR (50) NOT NULL, created_on TIMESTAMP NOT NULL, last_login TIMESTAMP)");
39 | stmt.executeUpdate("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS comments(id VARCHAR (36) PRIMARY KEY, username VARCHAR (36), body VARCHAR (500), created_on TIMESTAMP NOT NULL)");
40 |
41 | // Clean up any existing data
42 | stmt.executeUpdate("DELETE FROM users");
FALSE POSITIVE: Line 35 creates a Statement object, but this alone is not a vulnerability. The Statement is used with hardcoded SQL queries (lines 38-39, 42-43) with no user input. Later methods properly use PreparedStatement for user data.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/Postgres.java
35 | Statement stmt = c.createStatement();
36 |
37 | // Create Schema
38 | stmt.executeUpdate("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users(user_id VARCHAR (36) PRIMARY KEY, username VARCHAR (50) UNIQUE NOT NULL, password VARCHAR (50) NOT NULL, created_on TIMESTAMP NOT NULL, last_login TIMESTAMP)");
39 | stmt.executeUpdate("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS comments(id VARCHAR (36) PRIMARY KEY, username VARCHAR (36), body VARCHAR (500), created_on TIMESTAMP NOT NULL)");
40 |
41 | // Clean up any existing data
42 | stmt.executeUpdate("DELETE FROM users");
43 | stmt.executeUpdate("DELETE FROM comments");
44 |
45 | // Insert seed data
46 | insertUser("admin", "!!SuperSecretAdmin!!");
47 | insertUser("alice", "AlicePassword!");
48 | insertUser("bob", "BobPassword!");
49 | insertUser("eve", "$EVELknev^l");
FALSE POSITIVE: Line 42 executes 'DELETE FROM users' which is a hardcoded SQL string with no user input concatenation. This is part of database setup/initialization code (in setup() method) that cleans existing data.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/CommentsController.java
class CommentRequest implements Serializable
The CommentRequest class implements Serializable and is used with @RequestBody annotation. Spring Boot can deserialize arbitrary JSON to Java objects. While Spring's default JSON deserialization is relatively safe, implementing Serializable unnecessarily increases attack surface and could be exploited if custom deserialization logic is added or if alternative deserializers are configured.
`Comment createComment(@RequestHeader(value="x-auth-token") String token, @Reques``class CommentRequest implements Serializable`class CommentRequest {
public String username;
public String body;
}
Fix applied to prevent Insecure Deserialization
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/LoginController.java
class LoginRequest implements Serializable
The LoginRequest class implements Serializable and is used with @RequestBody annotation for JSON deserialization. This unnecessarily marks the class as serializable when only JSON binding is needed. This could enable deserialization attacks if the application configuration changes or custom deserializers are introduced.
`LoginResponse login(@RequestBody LoginRequest input)``class LoginRequest implements Serializable`class LoginRequest {
public String username;
public String password;
}
Fix applied to prevent Insecure Deserialization
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/Postgres.java
MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5");
The application uses MD5 for password hashing, which is cryptographically broken and unsuitable for password storage. MD5 is vulnerable to collision attacks and can be rapidly brute-forced with modern hardware. Passwords hashed with MD5 can be easily cracked, compromising user accounts.
`LoginResponse login(@RequestBody LoginRequest input)``if (Postgres.md5(input.password).equals(user.hashedPassword))``MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5");`import org.springframework.security.crypto.bcrypt.BCryptPasswordEncoder; BCryptPasswordEncoder encoder = new BCryptPasswordEncoder(); String hashedPassword = encoder.encode(password); boolean matches = encoder.matches(inputPassword, storedHash);
Fix applied to prevent Weak Cryptographic Hash (MD5)
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/CommentsController.java
String sql = "DELETE FROM comments where id = ?";
The deleteComment endpoint accepts a comment ID from the user but does not verify that the authenticated user owns that comment or has permission to delete it. Any authenticated user can delete any comment by supplying different ID values, leading to unauthorized data modification.
`Boolean deleteComment(@RequestHeader(value="x-auth-token") String token, @PathVa``return Comment.delete(id);``String sql = "DELETE FROM comments where id = ?";`String username = User.getUsernameFromToken(token);
Comment comment = Comment.findById(id);
if (comment == null || !comment.username.equals(username)) {
throw new Unauthorized("Cannot delete this comment");
}
return Comment.delete(id);
Fix applied to prevent Missing Authorization Check
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/LinkLister.java
return getLinks(url);
The getLinksV2 method attempts to prevent SSRF by blocking private IP ranges, but the validation is incomplete and bypassable. It doesn't block localhost (127.0.0.1), link-local addresses (169.254.x.x for cloud metadata), IPv6 addresses, DNS rebinding attacks, or redirects. The string prefix check for "192.168" is also flawed as it would allow "192.1689.1.1". Attackers can bypass these controls using alternate IP representations or DNS tricks.
`List<String> linksV2(@RequestParam String url) throws BadRequest{``return LinkLister.getLinksV2(url);``return getLinks(url);`InetAddress addr = InetAddress.getByName(aUrl.getHost()); if (addr.isLoopbackAddress() || addr.isLinkLocalAddress() || addr.isSiteLocalAddress()) { throw new BadRequest("Private IP not allowed"); }
Fix applied to prevent Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) - Incomplete Protection
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/client/index.html
<p class="card-text">{{{body}}}</p>
The Handlebars template uses triple braces {{{body}}} to render comment body content without HTML escaping. This allows user-submitted comments to be rendered as raw HTML, enabling attackers to inject malicious JavaScript that executes in other users' browsers when they view the comments section.
`<input type="text" id="new-comment" class="form-control" placeholder="Comment">``<p class="card-text">{{{body}}}</p>`<p class="card-text">{{body}}</p>
Fix applied to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/client/js/index.js
1 | $(document).ready(function(){
2 | var source = $("#comment-template").html();
3 | var template = Handlebars.compile(source);
4 |
5 | // Add JWT to every request
6 | $.ajaxSetup({ beforeSend: function(xhr) {
7 | xhr.setRequestHeader('x-auth-token', localStorage.jwt);
8 | }});
9 |
FALSE POSITIVE: Line 2 uses .html() to read the content of a template element (#comment-template), not to write user-controlled data to the DOM. This is reading from a static HTML template, which is then compiled by Handlebars on line 3. Reading content with .html() does not create an XSS vulnerability.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/client/js/index.js
21 | $(parent).remove();
22 | });
23 | });
24 | }
25 |
26 | function fetchComments() {
27 | $.get("http://localhost:8080/comments", function(data){
28 | $('#comments-container').html('')
29 | data.forEach(function(comment){
30 | if (comment.body.indexOf("<script>") < 0) {
31 | $("#comments-container").append(template(comment));
32 | }
33 | });
34 | setupDeleteCommentHandler();
35 | });
FALSE POSITIVE: Line 28 uses .html('') to clear/empty the comments container with an empty string literal. This is not setting user-controlled content. The actual comment rendering happens on line 31 using template(comment) with Handlebars, which provides auto-escaping by default. No untrusted data flows into the .html('') call.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/resources/application.properties
app.secret=edf10572-880c-4dd9-aaf0-6ec402f678db
The application contains a hardcoded secret key (app.secret=edf10572-880c-4dd9-aaf0-6ec402f678db) in the configuration file. This secret appears to be used for JWT token signing based on the jjwt dependencies in pom.xml. Hardcoded secrets in source code or configuration files can be easily extracted by attackers who gain access to the repository, leading to authentication bypass and unauthorized access.
`app.secret=edf10572-880c-4dd9-aaf0-6ec402f678db``app.secret=edf10572-880c-4dd9-aaf0-6ec402f678db`Use environment variable: app.secret=${APP_SECRET:default-value-for-dev} and set APP_SECRET in deployment environment
Fix applied to prevent Hardcoded Secret in Configuration
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/docker-compose.yml
3 | vulnado:
4 | build: .
5 | ports:
6 | - 8080:8080
7 | links:
8 | - db
9 | - internal_site
10 | environment:
11 | - PGPASSWORD=vulnado
12 | - PGDATABASE=vulnado
13 | - PGHOST=db:5432
14 | - PGUSER=postgres
15 | depends_on:
16 | - "db"
17 |
The docker-compose.yml file contains hardcoded database credentials exposed as environment variables. The password 'vulnado' is stored in plaintext at line 11 (PGPASSWORD=vulnado) for the application service. This allows anyone with access to the configuration file to see the database credentials, which could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to the database.
`- PGPASSWORD=vulnado``environment:`secrets:
db_password:
external: true
services:
vulnado:
environment:
- PGPASSWORD_FILE=/run/secrets/db_password
secrets:
- db_password
Storing secrets in environment variables or secure vaults keeps them out of source code and version control.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/docker-compose.yml
18 | client:
19 | build: client
20 | ports:
21 | - 1337:80
22 |
23 | db:
24 | image: postgres
25 | environment:
26 | - POSTGRES_PASSWORD=vulnado
27 | - POSTGRES_DB=vulnado
28 |
29 | internal_site:
30 | build: internal_site
The docker-compose.yml file contains hardcoded database credentials for the PostgreSQL service. The password 'vulnado' is stored in plaintext at line 26 (POSTGRES_PASSWORD=vulnado). This credentials exposure allows anyone with repository or deployment access to obtain the database password, potentially leading to unauthorized database access and data breaches.
`- POSTGRES_PASSWORD=vulnado``environment:`secrets:
postgres_password:
external: true
services:
db:
image: postgres
environment:
- POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE=/run/secrets/postgres_password
secrets:
- postgres_password
Storing secrets in environment variables or secure vaults keeps them out of source code and version control.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/docker-compose.yml
19 | build: client
20 | ports:
21 | - 1337:80
22 |
23 | db:
24 | image: postgres
25 | environment:
26 | - POSTGRES_PASSWORD=vulnado
27 | - POSTGRES_DB=vulnado
28 |
29 | internal_site:
30 | build: internal_site
The docker-compose.yml explicitly defines a hardcoded PostgreSQL database password 'vulnado' at line 26. This is the same finding as #2 but specifically flagged by the pattern matcher for the POSTGRES_PASSWORD variable. Hardcoded credentials in configuration files pose a significant security risk as they can be easily discovered through repository access or deployment artifacts.
`- POSTGRES_PASSWORD=vulnado``image: postgres`# Store password in .env file (excluded from git)
services:
db:
image: postgres
environment:
- POSTGRES_PASSWORD=${DB_PASSWORD}
# Or use Docker secrets as shown in finding #2
Storing secrets in environment variables or secure vaults keeps them out of source code and version control.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/CommentsController.java
6 | import org.springframework.boot.autoconfigure.*;
7 | import java.util.List;
8 | import java.io.Serializable;
9 |
10 | @RestController
11 | @EnableAutoConfiguration
12 | public class CommentsController {
13 | @Value("${app.secret}")
14 | private String secret;
15 |
16 | @CrossOrigin(origins = "*")
17 | @RequestMapping(value = "/comments", method = RequestMethod.GET, produces = "application/json")
18 | List<Comment> comments(@RequestHeader(value="x-auth-token") String token) {
19 | User.assertAuth(secret, token);
20 | return Comment.fetch_all();
FALSE POSITIVE: Line 13 uses @Value annotation to inject a configuration property 'app.secret' into a private field. This is standard Spring configuration injection, not XSS. The value is used for JWT token validation (line 19), not rendered in HTML templates.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/LoginController.java
7 | import org.springframework.stereotype.*;
8 | import org.springframework.beans.factory.annotation.*;
9 | import java.io.Serializable;
10 |
11 | @RestController
12 | @EnableAutoConfiguration
13 | public class LoginController {
14 | @Value("${app.secret}")
15 | private String secret;
16 |
17 | @CrossOrigin(origins = "*")
18 | @RequestMapping(value = "/login", method = RequestMethod.POST, produces = "application/json", consumes = "application/json")
19 | LoginResponse login(@RequestBody LoginRequest input) {
20 | User user = User.fetch(input.username);
21 | if (Postgres.md5(input.password).equals(user.hashedPassword)) {
FALSE POSITIVE: Line 14 uses @Value annotation to inject a configuration property 'app.secret' into a private field. This is standard Spring configuration injection, not XSS. The value is used for JWT operations (line 22), not rendered in HTML.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/Comment.java
48 | String body = rs.getString("body");
49 | Timestamp created_on = rs.getTimestamp("created_on");
50 | Comment c = new Comment(id, username, body, created_on);
51 | comments.add(c);
52 | }
53 | cxn.close();
54 | } catch (Exception e) {
55 | e.printStackTrace();
56 | System.err.println(e.getClass().getName()+": "+e.getMessage());
57 | } finally {
58 | return comments;
59 | }
60 | }
61 |
62 | public static Boolean delete(String id) {
The printStackTrace() call at line 55 in Comment.java prints detailed stack traces to standard error, which may expose sensitive information about the application's internal structure, file paths, and implementation details to attackers in production environments.
`} catch (Exception e) {``e.printStackTrace();`logger.error("Error fetching comments", e); // Use SLF4J or similar
This fix addresses the CWE-209 vulnerability by applying secure coding practices that prevent the identified attack vector.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/Postgres.java
93 | try {
94 | pStatement = connection().prepareStatement(sql);
95 | pStatement.setString(1, UUID.randomUUID().toString());
96 | pStatement.setString(2, username);
97 | pStatement.setString(3, md5(password));
98 | pStatement.executeUpdate();
99 | } catch(Exception e) {
100 | e.printStackTrace();
101 | }
102 | }
103 |
104 | private static void insertComment(String username, String body) {
105 | String sql = "INSERT INTO comments (id, username, body, created_on) VALUES (?, ?, ?, current_timestamp)";
106 | PreparedStatement pStatement = null;
107 | try {
The printStackTrace() call at line 100 in Postgres.java prints detailed stack traces to standard error during user insertion operations, potentially exposing sensitive information about database structure, credentials, and application internals to attackers.
`} catch(Exception e) {``e.printStackTrace();`logger.error("Error inserting user", e); // Use SLF4J or similar
This fix addresses the CWE-209 vulnerability by applying secure coding practices that prevent the identified attack vector.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/Postgres.java
107 | try {
108 | pStatement = connection().prepareStatement(sql);
109 | pStatement.setString(1, UUID.randomUUID().toString());
110 | pStatement.setString(2, username);
111 | pStatement.setString(3, body);
112 | pStatement.executeUpdate();
113 | } catch(Exception e) {
114 | e.printStackTrace();
115 | }
116 | }
117 | }
The printStackTrace() call at line 114 in Postgres.java prints detailed stack traces to standard error during comment insertion operations, potentially exposing sensitive information about the application's internal structure and database operations to attackers.
`} catch(Exception e) {``e.printStackTrace();`logger.error("Error inserting comment", e); // Use SLF4J or similar
This fix addresses the CWE-209 vulnerability by applying secure coding practices that prevent the identified attack vector.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/User.java
27 | public static void assertAuth(String secret, String token) {
28 | try {
29 | SecretKey key = Keys.hmacShaKeyFor(secret.getBytes());
30 | Jwts.parser()
31 | .setSigningKey(key)
32 | .parseClaimsJws(token);
33 | } catch(Exception e) {
34 | e.printStackTrace();
35 | throw new Unauthorized(e.getMessage());
36 | }
37 | }
38 |
39 | public static User fetch(String un) {
40 | Statement stmt = null;
41 | User user = null;
The printStackTrace() call at line 34 in User.java prints detailed stack traces during JWT authentication failures, potentially exposing sensitive information about the application's security implementation, JWT library details, and internal structure to attackers.
`} catch(Exception e) {``e.printStackTrace();`logger.error("Authentication failed", e); // Use SLF4J or similar
This fix addresses the CWE-209 vulnerability by applying secure coding practices that prevent the identified attack vector.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/User.java
51 | String user_id = rs.getString("user_id");
52 | String username = rs.getString("username");
53 | String password = rs.getString("password");
54 | user = new User(user_id, username, password);
55 | }
56 | cxn.close();
57 | } catch (Exception e) {
58 | e.printStackTrace();
59 | System.err.println(e.getClass().getName()+": "+e.getMessage());
60 | } finally {
61 | return user;
62 | }
63 | }
64 | }
The printStackTrace() call at line 58 in User.java prints detailed stack traces during user fetch operations, potentially exposing sensitive information about database structure, connection details, and application internals to attackers monitoring error outputs.
`} catch (Exception e) {``e.printStackTrace();`logger.error("Error fetching user", e); // Use SLF4J or similar
This fix addresses the CWE-209 vulnerability by applying secure coding practices that prevent the identified attack vector.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/Cowsay.java
17 | BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream()));
18 |
19 | String line;
20 | while ((line = reader.readLine()) != null) {
21 | output.append(line + "\n");
22 | }
23 | } catch (Exception e) {
24 | e.printStackTrace();
25 | }
26 | return output.toString();
27 | }
28 | }
The printStackTrace() method at line 24 in Cowsay.java prints the full stack trace to the console/logs. This can expose sensitive information about the application's internal structure, file paths, and potentially security-relevant details to attackers who have access to logs or error output. Stack traces should be logged using a proper logging framework with appropriate log levels and never exposed to end users.
`} catch (Exception e) {``e.printStackTrace();`} catch (Exception e) {
logger.error("Error executing cowsay command", e);
}
This fix addresses the CWE-209 vulnerability by applying secure coding practices that prevent the identified attack vector.
/home/ubuntu/sast-webapp/uploads/tmpvzwexh5m/src/main/java/com/scalesec/vulnado/Cowsay.java
10 | System.out.println(cmd);
11 | processBuilder.command("bash", "-c", cmd);
12 |
13 | StringBuilder output = new StringBuilder();
14 |
15 | try {
16 | Process process = processBuilder.start();
17 | BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream()));
18 |
19 | String line;
20 | while ((line = reader.readLine()) != null) {
21 | output.append(line + "\n");
22 | }
23 | } catch (Exception e) {
24 | e.printStackTrace();
FALSE POSITIVE: Line 17 creates a BufferedReader to read the OUTPUT stream from a child process (cowsay command). This is not a vulnerability - it's the standard way to read output from a subprocess. The actual security issue in this code is the Command Injection vulnerability at line 9 where user input is concatenated into a shell command without sanitization, but that's not what this finding is flagging. Reading from process.getInputStream() is safe and necessary.